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THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 
GERALD J. POSTEMA* 
“Since jurisprudence is a science of human activities, and touches 
humanity both on its social and its individual side, it has relations to all 
human sciences.”1 
In contemporary jurisprudential writing, there is no lack of attention to 
method. Although I have participated in this activity,2 I have reservations 
about it, partly because it tends to be narcissistic, but more because it can 
encourage an unwelcome form of intellectual-boundary policing. Despite 
these reservations, I will offer in this essay some reflections on method in 
jurisprudence, reflections stirred by Professor Tamanaha’s impressive new 
book, A Realistic Theory of Law.3  Although my remarks will be critical at 
points, they are meant to build on and elaborate proposals Tamanaha makes 
in his book, and are offered in the hope of expanding jurisprudential efforts 
and effacing intellectual boundaries, rather than defining new ones or 
policing old ones.  
William Galbraith Miller, in a remarkable, albeit puzzling, book written 
at the turn of the twentieth century, anticipated a central methodological 
theme of Tamanaha’s work. He wrote, “Our primary object in Jurisprudence 
. . . may be to enumerate, classify, and account for the various shapes which 
the matter under investigation has assumed.”4 He further noted, “Common 
sense rebels against the restriction of jurisprudence to the anatomy of the 
skeleton of law in forms, and strives continually to deal with the physiology 
of society.”5 
Tamanaha argues vigorously and persuasively for the revival of a 
genuinely historical and sociological dimension of jurisprudence. He 
develops and defends such a theory that locates law in the living, constantly 
changing environment of human societies. In the first part of this essay, I 
will argue for an understanding of the enterprise of jurisprudence that is 
even more ambitious than Tamanaha’s, but one that finds a secure place for 
his historical and social theory. In the second section of this essay, I will 
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examine the methodology of Tamanaha’s social-legal theory, offering 
suggestions aimed at further elaborating and enriching it. 
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE 
I begin with some unscientific observations. Law, the focal subject of the 
enterprise of jurisprudence, is a complex social phenomenon linked with 
other social phenomena that structure the lives of human beings who are 
equipped with certain distinctive capacities, limited by certain weaknesses, 
and driven by certain needs, among them the need to live together. This is 
not a theoretically partisan thought, but a common starting point for 
philosophical reflection on law for more than two millennia. It is as central 
to the thinking of Aristotle and Aquinas as to that of Grotius and Hobbes, 
to Marsilius of Padua as to Matthew Hale and Jeremy Bentham. We might 
likewise observe that the specific shape law might take in any community 
of human beings can vary with differences in the social, political, and 
natural circumstances in which they live, and that these variations 
themselves vary over time. This observation was available to ancient as well 
as modern writers. 
Thus, the notion that to understand law we need to observe its forms and 
behavior in its natural social and historical habitat is not a piece of hard-
won theoretical wisdom; it is just common sense. It is not a little surprising, 
then, that in the twenty-first century a theorist of law of Tamanaha’s 
sophistication should find it necessary to argue these observations shape the 
jurisprudential enterprise. Yet, contemporary jurisprudence has found it 
easy to ignore them. Tamanaha’s work in A Realistic Theory of Law 
demonstrates the value of keeping them clearly in view. 
Tamanaha seeks to revitalize the historical-sociological tradition of 
jurisprudential thinking that flourished at the turn of the twentieth century—
a tradition that has been systematically dismissed (when it is not simply 
ignored) by contemporary legal theory. He argues that it has a rightful and 
vital place alongside “natural law” (i.e., systematic normative moral-
political philosophy) and “analytic jurisprudence” (dominated these days by 
latter-day Hartian positivism). These three branches represent different 
perspectives or “angles” on law, each with its distinctive theoretical focus. 
The social-historical “angle” must be added to the other two, he argues, 
because they are blind to it, and a “new balance” among the three must be 
struck. I agree that robust social and historical inquiry is an integral part of 
the jurisprudential enterprise. I also agree that its role has not been 
sufficiently appreciated by contemporary Anglo-American legal 













task of contemporary jurisprudence, and it undersells the potential 
contribution of his social-historical inquiry to it. At the risk of offering 
Tamanaha an unwanted gift, I propose to sketch briefly a larger vision of 
the jurisprudential enterprise, in which his social-historical inquiry has a 
secure place.  
To begin, I believe we must revise Tamanaha’s tripartite characterization 
of the enterprise of jurisprudence. Tamanaha’s orienting assumption is that 
the enterprise is theoretical, aimed at understanding and explanation, rather 
than practical, aimed immediately at intending, judging, and acting. 
Nevertheless, its object is fundamentally practical. Law is a body of 
knowledge, to be sure, but one focused on and arising from praxis. 
Unfortunately, Tamanaha identifies two of the three “angles” on this object 
of theoretical reflection with particular theories—natural law and post-
Hartian positivism. A better characterization, I suggest, would identify 
complementary domains and disciplines of inquiry. Among them would be 
the ideal domain, centered around inquiries into the values and principles 
by which we seek to determine what law (and laws) should be. Theorists 
working in this domain explore our aspirations for law and seek to articulate 
standards with which to evaluate current law and principles to guide 
construction of better law. From another perspective, we might focus on the 
world in which we currently live, a world of imperfect practices and 
institutions that demands our understanding. Our praxis is situated in on-
going practices that shape our practical deliberations. Responsible action 
requires that participants understand the practices and institutions, the 
norms, values, and concepts that give them their distinctive shape, and the 
larger social and historical contexts in which they operate. There are not, 
then, just three “angles” on legal experience, but many of them, differing 
with respect to the aspects or domains of legal experience on which they 
focus and the disciplines they deploy in seeking their contributions to 
understanding their common object. We need a wider methodological vision 
in which to locate these different disciplines.  
To capture this methodological vision,6 I suggest we look to historical 
examples of a wider jurisprudential enterprise. Sir Edward Coke boasted 
that common-law jurisprudence was a “sociable science” (scientia socialis), 
drawing on the rules and principles of all the other excellent sciences, 
human and divine.7 Some may wish to challenge the accuracy of Coke’s 
description of the jurisprudential ambitions of seventeenth-century common 
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law, although his successor, Sir Matthew Hale, did as much as any scholar 
and jurist of his day to bring divine, human, and natural learning to bear on 
the project of understanding the law that he professionally practiced.8 As 
Tamanaha rightly notes, in the next century a robust practice of sociable 
jurisprudence took root in Scotland.9 From within this tradition Miller 
wrote, “[t]he phenomena of jurisprudence are continuous” with the sciences 
of history, politics, ethics, and economics.10 “We cannot, for scientific 
purposes, draw an arbitrary line between law and these sciences and confine 
the province of jurisprudence to legislation, as Austin virtually did . . . .”11  
General jurisprudence, modeled after Scottish jurisprudence, would seek 
to bring all forms of rational inquiry together to deepen human 
understanding of the law and its place in the social and political lives of 
human beings. The common object of this enterprise is law in all its forms. 
Understanding this complex object is the work of many, including those 
engaged in philosophy (moral and political philosophy as well as 
epistemology, metaphysics, and logic), theology, history, economics, social 
inquiry, and psychology. The understanding that can be achieved thereby is 
not merely the consequence of aggregating the results of each separate mode 
of inquiry. A more substantial interaction and interdependence—a 
partnership—is possible. To illustrate what I have in mind, permit me to 
sketch what a truly philosophical jurisprudence might look like and the 
place it might hold in general jurisprudence.  
Philosophical jurisprudence seeks a thoroughly philosophical 
understanding of law. Its subject matter is quotidian law, wherever it is to 
be found; its discipline is philosophy. As a mode of philosophy, it seeks a 
deeper, truth-approximating understanding of human experience. It works 
with our partial, disjointed, and confused self-understandings, including, 
but never limited to, the intuitions embedded within them. Philosophical 
jurisprudence begins with current, concrete, common experience of law, 
locating it in its natural habitat of human social and political life. For this 
purpose, it casts a wide net. Of course, the experience of jurispiriti—
attorneys, judges, lawmakers, and officials—is included in this gathering of 
data. But no less important are the experiences of those whose lives are 
focused elsewhere, but who must live in the practical, daily milieu created 
and sustained by law—those who embrace it, those who are alienated from 
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it, and those who wish to pay as little attention to it as possible: the decent 
man who values the rule of law, the bad man who doesn’t give a fig for it, 
the victim oppressed by it, and the man on the Clapham omnibus. It also 
casts a wide net across time, recognizing that human beings have organized 
their social lives in law-like ways for a very long time.  
Philosophical jurisprudence approaches this data of jurisprudence with 
the tools and dispositions of philosophy, of which I will mention four. First, 
philosophy is an essentially discursive enterprise. It is discursive in that it 
recognizes that the concepts and understandings that it seeks to order get 
their meaning only in and through networks of related concepts and 
understandings, neighbors nearby and more distant. It explores them with 
techniques of analysis and argument, but it is not narrowly “analytical.” It 
tests its articulations of concepts against the complex phenomena of human 
experience and demands not only clarity but also illumination, not only 
precision but depth of understanding.  
Second, on the ideal I have in mind, philosophical jurisprudence is slow 
to file experience into hermetically sealed boxes. As Michael Oakeshott 
reminded us, philosophy done properly is “suspicious of every attempt to 
limit the enquiry.”12 Although they are inveterate distinction-makers, 
philosophers nevertheless are willing to efface boundaries, explore 
connections, and demand deeper understanding of superficially disparate 
phenomena. Taking a cue from C. S. Peirce, I have called this disposition 
“synechism.”13 Philosophical jurisprudence, when it gathers data for its 
exploration, and as it pursues this exploration, looks for continuities and 
illuminating similarities. It asks: what is law like? rather than declaring, this 
is not like law and hence not law properly so-called. Understanding, it 
holds, is found as much in relating and integrating as in separating and 
distinguishing. Always seeking precision, it nevertheless is willing to accept 
ambiguity when ambiguity better represents the phenomena under study. 
Third, philosophy is resolutely, constitutionally critical—especially self-
critical. It is Socratic, not in the law-school, pedagogical sense, but in the 
original sense dramatically presented in Plato’s dialogues. In that respect, 
philosophy is potentially destabilizing. It may seek to reconcile disparate 
intuitions, but not to reconcile us to them; and the reconciliation always 
carries the potential of demoting or even dismissing our favored intuitions 
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if, from a wider perspective, they mislead or disorient our better 
understanding. Because of these characteristics, philosophical 
jurisprudence is inclined to pursue depth rather than closure, comprehensive 
insight rather than consensus.14 At the same time, it is a common enterprise 
(albeit often pursued by solitary scholars), a common endeavor, the work of 
many hands extended over time.  
Finally, philosophy is constitutionally historical. I have said elsewhere, 
echoing Fernand Braudel’s quip about historians, that for philosophers, the 
history of philosophy—the problems, projects, theories, and arguments that 
have unfolded over time—“sticks to [their] thinking like soil to the 
gardener’s spade.”15 It sticks to their spades because it is the very soil they 
continually turn over, in which they plant, and from which they draw vital 
nutrients for their latest thoughts. The long tradition of philosophy is the 
tradition of engaging continually with its tradition, and this engagement of 
philosophy in its history is always philosophical, and hence resolutely 
critical. This tradition grows and becomes richer through this critical 
engagement and shrinks and becomes parched when it fails resolutely to do 
so. 
Philosophical jurisprudence is philosophical in this wide, and admittedly 
ideal, sense. It must be sociable: it pursues its project of deeper and wider 
understanding of the corner of human experience represented by the practice 
and experience of lawin partnership with other modes of inquiry focused on 
the same range of human experience. It joins and learns from psychology, 
sociology, art, and literature about the dimensions and depth of human 
nature; it joins and learns from economics, political science, and sociology 
about the institutions that structure human life in communities; it joins and 
learns from history about the variety of such institutions, the patterns of their 
interaction and influence, and the impact of political and social 
arrangements on them. From its own history and the history of theological 
reflection on such matters, it learns of the variety of ways in which implicit 
understandings of human nature and of social, political, and legal 
institutions have been articulated and defended. History of this kind is 
especially important for the critical engagement of philosophical 
jurisprudence in its theoretical history. Bentham fantasized about 
participating in a dialogue among the great philosophers, all gathered 
together at the same time in the same room—we might imagine, for 
																																																								
14.  This is not to say that there is no place for what Fred Schauer calls, “analytic isolation,” but 
analytic isolation is a jurisprudential tactic, one tool in the toolbox of philosophical jurisprudence, and 
not the only or always the most important. Frederick Schauer, Preferences for Law?, 42 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 87, 94 (2017). 













jurisprudential purposes, bringing together Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Al 
Farabi, Maimonides, Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, Althusius, Hooker, 
Grotius, and Hobbes. This is a typical Benthamite fantasy, but not a 
genuinely philosophical one, in my view, for it fails to appreciate that each 
of these theorists of the law set out to understand the self-understandings of 
law of their day, which were embedded in and reflective of the lives of 
jurispiriti and ordinary folk alike. Social, political, and often ecclesiastical 
history is essential ballast and context for critical engagement with their 
theories. We cannot pursue philosophical jurisprudence responsibly without 
entering a partnership with these other component disciplines of general 
jurisprudence. There is an important place for Tamanaha’s project in this 
enterprise. Let us now consider his project. 
II. GATHERING THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 
In chapters 4-6 of his book, Professor Tamanaha offers a sophisticated 
“genealogical account” of law from which I learned a great deal, especially 
from his discussion of international and transnational law.16 Tamanaha 
orients his discussion with the very general question: “What is Law?”17 This 
formulation suggests at least two quite different questions, based on two 
ways to understand the “is” at the center of the question. The first question 
uses the is of identification. On this reading, the question is, “Where and 
how can I find law?” An adequate answer to this question would offer a 
criterion that would enable us to gather good examples of law. Socratic 
inquirers would not be satisfied with this criterion, however, because they 
ask a different question, focusing on the is of explanation. They ask, “What 
sort of thing is it that we have found when we have gathered all the 
exemplars of law answering to the question of identification?” Those who 
ask this question seek a deeper understanding of the phenomena gathered 
for this purpose. 
Tamanaha is mindful of the difference between these two questions. 
Indeed, his sketch of the stages of jurisprudential theory construction 
presupposes such an awareness.18 At the first stage, he maintains, theorists 
begin to collect data about the phenomena of law for their exploration. At 
the second stage, they articulate the way those whose experience is shaped 
by these phenomena understand them. At the third stage, they pursue 
empirical and historical investigations of these phenomena. These stages 
provide increasingly sophisticated and refined data for jurisprudential 
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theorizing. At the fourth stage, theorists construct their explanatory theory; 
they do what Tamanaha calls their “conceptual work.”19  
Tamanaha offers the following “conventionalist” answer to the question, 
“What is Law?”: “[L]aw is whatever people identify and treat through their 
social practices as ‘law.’”20 Tamanaha formulates this master thesis several 
times in somewhat different terms. He invites us to consider what people 
“collectively” or “conventionally” say and do in their respective social 
groups and communities. He uses different terms or phrases to characterize 
what they do: they “collectively [or conventionally] recognize,”21 they 
“conventionally identify,”22 they “identify and treat through their social 
practices,”23 and they conventionally accept.24 Sometimes they are said to 
recognize (or identify) something as law, but at other times as “law”—that 
is, he seems to focus on what they call law. Taken as a conventionalist 
criterion of identification, it could be expressed as follows: Law in society 
S comprises whatever people in S collectively recognize as law (or “law”). 
For the remainder of my discussion, I will focus on this formulation of his 
master thesis. Tamanaha may also intend for this thesis to articulate the core 
of a conventionalist explanatory theory of law, but I will not comment on 
that proposal. 
Viewed as a criterion for the identification of the data of jurisprudence, 
this formulation still needs refinement if it is accurately to represent 
Tamanaha’s project, as I understand it. As I have noted, Tamanaha 
sometimes seems to focus the theorists’ attention on the linguistic practice 
of people in target communities, on what they call or regard as “law” or 
“legal.”25 Of course, people who are willing to call something law do not 
necessarily accept or practice its norms or regard them as binding on them 
as law. To determine what people in another culture call law, he 
acknowledges, requires skillful and sensitive translation of indigenous 
languages, but it is linguistic rather than legal practice that ultimately 
determines the adequacy of the translation.  
Despite his language, I do not think Tamanaha has linguistic practice in 
mind. What appears to be the canonical formulation of his master thesis 
urges the theorist to seek out what people regard—“identify and treat 
through their social practices”—as law.26 And it is clear from his treatment 
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of data regarding law in primitive (“hunter-gatherer”) societies that he does 
not focus on linguistic practice.27 He acknowledges that people in primitive 
societies may not have a term in their language that could properly be 
translated “law,” and even if they did, we do not have access to their 
language to fix a translation. What we must do, when we consider such 
societies, is look to their practice, to the extent we can reconstruct it, and 
identify features of it that bear some significant analogy in substance and 
function to features of our law-involving practices.28 Indeed, this is the 
strategy he follows in gathering relevant jurisprudential data from 
international and transnational experience.29 Hence, I believe Tamanaha’s 
master thesis directs theorists gathering data for their work to look to what 
people in their various societies treat through their social practices as 
elements bearing sufficient, illuminating similarities to what the ordinary 
people (as well as jurispiriti) in theorists’ home societies take to be law. 
They look to what people in those societies think and do when they think 
about and use what theorists can regard as roughly analogous to what they 
and people in their society think and do.  
Starting at this point may seem to bias the theoretical project from the 
outset, but this need not worry us greatly, if the similarities noted at this 
point need only be rough, and if further evidence and analysis will go into 
gathering and refining this data. There is no point “from nowhere” from 
which our theoretical exploration can begin, whether that exploration be 
empirical or conceptual, a project of natural science, of logic, or of 
jurisprudence. Path dependence is an inescapable feature of every human 
intellectual endeavor. 
But our theorists should heed two warnings, which might constrain 
somewhat Tamanaha’s otherwise latitudinarian attitude regarding what 
indigenous people “do with” their law.30 First, when seeking to understand 
the products of human invention, we must keep in mind that not every use 
to which a social object may be put will illuminate the nature of that social 
object. Laptops can be used to hold windows open and candlesticks can be 
used for weapons, as Professor Plum did in the library. But we learn little 
about these cultural objects by observing and seeking to integrate these uses 
into our understanding. Listening to what people say (inferring therefrom 
what they think) and watching what they do, and especially do with, cultural 
objects is an important task for the cultural theorist, but it takes sensitivity 
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and judgment to determine when the objects are used “in the right way,”31 
where the right way is determined not by the observer-theorist, but rather 
by those engaged in the practice of their use. To complicate matters, the 
observer-theorist must also acknowledge that cultural objects, like customs 
and conventions, can be misused, or used in novel ways, with the result that 
the “right way” of their use may be altered or expanded. Sometimes, ex 
iniuria ius oritur. 
Second, in gathering the relevant jurisprudential data, we must look to 
more than just what people in our target communities do, and especially 
what they do with various potentially law-relevant cultural objects. Rather, 
we need to attend to what people do in practices that appear roughly similar 
to practices we tend to regard as legal. Doing so we must recognize that 
what they do when engaged in their practices may differ in significant ways 
from what we do, and, more importantly, that what they think about what 
they are doing, if they were able to articulate it, might be quite different 
from what we think we are doing. Tamanaha’s work in this respect builds 
on an important insight that I wish to elaborate briefly.  
The insight is that, when we go abroad geographically or temporally, we 
find law when we find people individually and collectively engaged in 
meaningful law-like practices. Such practices involve behaviors that 
constitute performances, that is, actions that are meant to conform to, and 
are judged by their conformity to, certain standards of competency. 
Participating in these practices requires a degree of mastery as measured by 
these standards. So, to understand these actions or activities one must 
understand the meaning they have as judged relative to these standards. The 
practice calls for judgment by those engaged in it and those observing it. 
Thus, competent participation in the practices involves some degree of 
reflective grasp of the standards and an ability to guide practice-relevant 
behavior by this grasp. Moreover, the practices that the jurisprudential 
theorists have in view are themselves shaped in part by the understandings 
of competent participants. What the participants are doing and how what 
they are doing relates to other social practices and institutions in the vicinity 
are determined by their understanding of what they are doing and why. This 
is not to say that indigenous understandings are necessarily correct, for 
participants need not be clairvoyant about their practices and some may be 
uncertain or confused about what they are doing. The reflective character of 
the activity does not guarantee accuracy of the reflections. The meanings of 
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the practices, and the standards by which performances constituting them 
are evaluated, are not a simple function of the beliefs of practitioners. 
Nevertheless, when theorists gather the data of jurisprudence, when they 
gather what people think about what they are doing, what they gather is not 
epiphenomenal; it is intrinsic to the phenomena. What they believe does not 
constitute their practice, but it is, as old common lawyers liked to say, the 
best evidence we have regarding that practice. Theorists must do the best 
they can to uncover, identify, understand, and articulate this reflective grasp 
of the practice by those engaging in it. 
What is also true of legal practices is that, as societies grow more 
complex and are capable of releasing at least some of their members from 
grinding subsistence labor, those with some leisure reflect more widely on 
their practices, offering more general and articulate accounts of common 
understandings of their practices in stories, myths and theories. These 
implicit “folk concepts,” as Tamanaha calls them, are given theoretical 
articulation and defense.32 And these theories and conceptions can achieve 
a degree of autonomy from the practices themselves, influencing the 
directions in which the practices develop and change. These philosophical 
or theological theories themselves have a history, interlaced with the history 
of the increasingly sophisticated development of social, economic, political, 
and ecclesiastical institutions of the societies in which they are produced. 
“The idea of right [i.e., ius] has a history,” Miller wrote, “so have laws 
themselves, and so has the philosophy that consciously discusses those laws 
[and the idea of right].”33 
Theorists seeking a comprehensive understanding of law must gather 
their data from the behavior, implicit understandings, and theoretical 
articulations of those understandings of those who engage in law-like 
practices. It is at this point that the partnership between social-historical 
inquiry and philosophical jurisprudence can bear fruit. The two modes of 
inquiry bring different but complementary skills, tools, and intellectual 
dispositions to the partnership. Let me propose here a friendly amendment 
to Tamanaha’s project. His project would be greatly enriched, I believe, if 
it were to include exploration of the attempts by theoretically inclined 
observers of the various “forms of law” to give articulate expression to the 
inherited and practiced understandings implicit in them. Such theorists 
might include card-carrying philosophers like Aristotle, Kant, and Bentham, 
philosopher-theologians like Al Farabi, Aquinas, Ockham, and Hooker, and 
theoretically inclined practitioners and jurists like Marsilius of Padua and 
																																																								
32.  TAMANAHA, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
33.  MILLER, supra note 1, at 16. 












Matthew Hale. Doing so may bring into focus dimensions or aspects of 
law—or at least of law in certain historical contexts—that we otherwise 
might overlook. It may also enable us to understand better how social forces 
can work on law to effect changes in the law and in other social and political 
institutions, for it can give us insight into how law in its rational, deliberative 
dimension responds to, incorporates, and redirects these forces. 
I conclude with one example from a part of this legal-theoretical history 
with which I am familiar: classical common law jurisprudence.34 Briefly 
stated, classical common law jurists, Matthew Hale prominent among 
them,35 believed that, while law may be regarded as a body of propositions 
of law, these propositions cannot properly be understood if they are 
abstracted from the practice of reasoning from which they emerged. For 
these jurists, law is a reasoned thing: not that its propositions are necessarily 
reasonable as measured by some external standard, but rather that they are 
products of a distinctive process of deliberative reasoning that takes place 
in a public, forensic context. Concrete rules of law emerge from adjudged 
instances of such deliberative reasoning engaging the extant body of law to 
resolve practical problems of ordinary life that were brought to the court. 
The emerging and constantly evolving law was not, on this view, the result 
of any judge’s decision, but rather were the common work of many hands 
over time. Judges, “these great traders in [legal] learning,” bring their 
several acquisitions “into a common stock by mutual communication,” Hale 
writes; thereby each becomes “the participant and common possessor of the 
other’s learning and knowledge.”36  
Law, on this view, is a practiced discipline of practical reasoning shaped 
by the need to bring to bear a secure grasp of broad principles with a refined 
understanding and appreciation of the details of human affairs and 
conversation to forge practical judgments regarding the regular interactions 
of daily civic life. It is fundamentally a discursive discipline—involving at 
its core the giving, taking, and assessing reasons and tracing out their 
practical implications—which takes place paradigmatically in the course of 
public disputation. As Coke put it: “One shall not know of what metal a bell 
is [made] until it [is] well beaten; nor can the law be well known without 
disputation.”37 Legal propositions have their content, status, and force just 
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insofar as they are incorporated in the body of law, where incorporation is 
a substantive and functional rather than formal matter, not a matter of 
official “acceptance,” but of discursive argument. 
Professor Tamanaha recognizes that “professional legal culture shapes 
and affects the operation of law” and his paper in this volume of the 
Washington University Law Review develops this theme in rich detail.38  Yet 
he, too quickly in my view, relegates this effect to the forces of legal 
formalism and self-interested gatekeeping of the monopoly-loving legal 
elite. I think willingness to listen more intently to the theoretical views I 
mentioned above, rather than treating them as epiphenomenal 
rationalizations, may provide insights into just how forces internal to the 
law, and indigenous participant understandings of it, may team up with 
larger forces to move the law and important social and political institutions.  
Time and again through the human history, theological, philosophical, 
jurisprudential and institutional elements were powerfully intertwined. An 
understanding of how the forces described in Tamanaha’s book and recent 
essay work involves, I should think, understanding how these theoretical 
articulations promoted, retarded, extended, and enhanced forces external to 
the practice of law. Careful exploration of these elements by practitioners 
of philosophical jurisprudence and of social-legal theory together could 
yield insights into the way law moves other social institutions and is moved 
by them. I suspect that the discursive dimension of law has played a very 
large role in its development and transformation. It is a matter for our 
systematic general jurisprudential theory to determine what role we should 
ultimately assign to it, but we cannot ignore it without losing sight of an 
important part of law’s history. Here there is room for a vital partnership 
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